One Marine Remembers:
“We were able to wash the red dirt of Khe Sanh from our bodies,” said Hale. “However, the memories will always be with us. Memories of all who fought – many gave away all of their tomorrows. Some came home with scars deep in their hearts.”
The Siege of Khe Sanh
The United States Army and the People’s Army of Vietnam fought The Battle of Khe Sanh near the border between South and North Vietnam. The Battle was fought for 77 days. It was one of the longest and deadliest battles of the Vietnam War. It began in Jan 21, 1968, six years after the United States Marines made a base there.
Khe Sanh is located in northwestern Quang Tri province of South Vietnam, just south of the 17th parallel, basically where North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos meet. The People’s Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) used this area around Khe Sanh as the key route into South Vietnam from the North. United States saw this area as a way to see the traffic between the North and the South on the rough, mountainous Ho Chi Minh Trail. At first, only one company of Marines was stationed there to patrol and keep watch on the enemy.
The United States heard that the North was developing a plan to attack Khe Sanh. They thought that the North was hoping to defeat America just as it had defeated the French in 1954. The U.S. military was frustrated with the inability to engage and kill the Viet Cong guerrillas. They saw this as an opportunity to “bait” the enemy into concentrating their forces and then unleash aerial assaults to inflict huge enemy casualties. General Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, also believed a U.S. presence there was essential to deter the North’s ability to attack the populated coastal areas of Northern South Vietnam.
To build up an effective defense, America shifted more Marines to Khe Sanh. They did so gradually so that they did not warn the PAVN of our strategy. They wanted them to continue to move in and concentrate their forces in the surrounding area. A large number of troops needs supplies, ammunition and equipment. All of these would be targets for U.S. bombers.
Eventually, the U.S. military leadership had to tell the Marines at Khe Sanh that they had company. The North had succeeded in surrounding Khe Sanh with thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers. A ground attack and artillery bombardment followed. It was so intense that it destroyed helicopters, the mess hall, trucks and the base commander’s headquarters. With a direct hit on our main ammunition storage site, a huge explosion detonated. It caused over 16,000 artillery shells, a huge supply of tear gas, and other explosives to detonate. The fire was intense. Many of our troops were injured. The lost supplies were replaced by plane and helicopter drops which flew right through the attacks. Unloading of supplies continuously occurred along side of bombs and heavy machine gun fire. We fought back with men on the land and with air strikes. The initial assault was stopped, and the fighting stretched on into days and weeks.
The North Vietnamese General Giap, originally intended to repeat his victory over the French in 1954, at Dien Bien Phu. There he laid a successful siege of the enemy positions and was able to achieve a strategic victory. He was frustrated at Khe Sanh, because the U.S. forces had more powerful artillery and air power. The U.S. also had sensors that could detect large concentrations of enemy forces. Whenever Giap massed enough troops for a ground assault, they were decimated by American bombers.
Some believed the General Giap wanted us to shift our troops away from the more populated areas. The U.S. Khe Sanh strategy did have this effect. At the end of January, the North Vietnamese took advantage of this when they launched the Tet offensive across the rest of South Vietnam. General Westmoreland was committed to Khe Sanh, and at one time he believed the Tet offensive was an attempt to divert U.S. attention from Khe Sanh.
By early March, we estimated that enemy combatants totaled approximately 6,000 to 8,000. That was down considerably from the 20,000 at the beginning. Besides the enemy casualties the U.S. inflicted, U.S. intelligence believed that they were withdrawing. Many believed it was because the PAVN had achieved one goal of diverting the U.S. forces and conducted the Tet offensive in January and February.
The battle ended after 77 days of intense fighting. The U.S. had lost 1000 men killed in action, and the PAVN many more than that. The U.S. could claim tactical victory by holding Khe Sanh, and by beating off the general Tet offensive.
But the North Vietnamese achieved a far more strategic victory. They had shaken the belief of the U.S. public in military superiority, and shown that it would take a much larger U.S. commitment to defeat the North Vietnamese forces. Just as they forced negotiations with the French after Dien Bien Phu in 1954, this conflict would eventually lead to negotiations with the U.S. and eventual U.S. withdrawal.
Khe Sanh is located in northwestern Quang Tri province of South Vietnam, just south of the 17th parallel, basically where North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos meet. The People’s Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) used this area around Khe Sanh as the key route into South Vietnam from the North. United States saw this area as a way to see the traffic between the North and the South on the rough, mountainous Ho Chi Minh Trail. At first, only one company of Marines was stationed there to patrol and keep watch on the enemy.
The United States heard that the North was developing a plan to attack Khe Sanh. They thought that the North was hoping to defeat America just as it had defeated the French in 1954. The U.S. military was frustrated with the inability to engage and kill the Viet Cong guerrillas. They saw this as an opportunity to “bait” the enemy into concentrating their forces and then unleash aerial assaults to inflict huge enemy casualties. General Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, also believed a U.S. presence there was essential to deter the North’s ability to attack the populated coastal areas of Northern South Vietnam.
To build up an effective defense, America shifted more Marines to Khe Sanh. They did so gradually so that they did not warn the PAVN of our strategy. They wanted them to continue to move in and concentrate their forces in the surrounding area. A large number of troops needs supplies, ammunition and equipment. All of these would be targets for U.S. bombers.
Eventually, the U.S. military leadership had to tell the Marines at Khe Sanh that they had company. The North had succeeded in surrounding Khe Sanh with thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers. A ground attack and artillery bombardment followed. It was so intense that it destroyed helicopters, the mess hall, trucks and the base commander’s headquarters. With a direct hit on our main ammunition storage site, a huge explosion detonated. It caused over 16,000 artillery shells, a huge supply of tear gas, and other explosives to detonate. The fire was intense. Many of our troops were injured. The lost supplies were replaced by plane and helicopter drops which flew right through the attacks. Unloading of supplies continuously occurred along side of bombs and heavy machine gun fire. We fought back with men on the land and with air strikes. The initial assault was stopped, and the fighting stretched on into days and weeks.
The North Vietnamese General Giap, originally intended to repeat his victory over the French in 1954, at Dien Bien Phu. There he laid a successful siege of the enemy positions and was able to achieve a strategic victory. He was frustrated at Khe Sanh, because the U.S. forces had more powerful artillery and air power. The U.S. also had sensors that could detect large concentrations of enemy forces. Whenever Giap massed enough troops for a ground assault, they were decimated by American bombers.
Some believed the General Giap wanted us to shift our troops away from the more populated areas. The U.S. Khe Sanh strategy did have this effect. At the end of January, the North Vietnamese took advantage of this when they launched the Tet offensive across the rest of South Vietnam. General Westmoreland was committed to Khe Sanh, and at one time he believed the Tet offensive was an attempt to divert U.S. attention from Khe Sanh.
By early March, we estimated that enemy combatants totaled approximately 6,000 to 8,000. That was down considerably from the 20,000 at the beginning. Besides the enemy casualties the U.S. inflicted, U.S. intelligence believed that they were withdrawing. Many believed it was because the PAVN had achieved one goal of diverting the U.S. forces and conducted the Tet offensive in January and February.
The battle ended after 77 days of intense fighting. The U.S. had lost 1000 men killed in action, and the PAVN many more than that. The U.S. could claim tactical victory by holding Khe Sanh, and by beating off the general Tet offensive.
But the North Vietnamese achieved a far more strategic victory. They had shaken the belief of the U.S. public in military superiority, and shown that it would take a much larger U.S. commitment to defeat the North Vietnamese forces. Just as they forced negotiations with the French after Dien Bien Phu in 1954, this conflict would eventually lead to negotiations with the U.S. and eventual U.S. withdrawal.